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Comments

The Role of Expectations in Assessing
Intended Loss in Mortgage-Fraud Schemes
GabrielleA. Bernsteint

INTRODUCTION

Mortgage-fraud schemes are aimed at inducing mortgage
lenders to make loans they would not otherwise make based on
fraudulent loan applications and the falsification of other information relating to the borrower and the value of the home, which
is pledged as collateral. These schemes often result in sizeable
losses to lenders, initially because a perpetrator fails to repay a
fraudulently obtained loan. Then, the lender learns that the actual value of the collateral on the loan-the mortgaged property-is feeble in comparison to what it was purported to be worth
in order to secure the loan, such that the entire loan is not recoverable through a foreclosure sale.
The persisting depressed economy is accommodating to
the execution of mortgage-fraud schemes, providing industry insiders with expanded opportunities to exploit the vulnerable: the
mortgage industry and unwitting homebuyers. For instance, the
current economy affords ample opportunities for cheap purchases
of low-value homes, the prices of which might then be inflated
t BA 2008, Wellesley College; JD Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago Law
School.
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through mortgage fraud. In addition, the recession has produced
many potential homebuyers who, because of their poor credit and
low income, are willing to enter sketchier-than-usual transactions with mortgage brokers or sellers of property. The losses to
lenders, combined with the ill-fated outcomes for homebuyers
who default on their loans and the massive and unexpected
changes in property values, are the sharp results of mortgage
fraud's presence in the current economy.1
One reason these losses are significant is because defendants convicted of mortgage fraud are sentenced in accordance
with § 2B1.1 of the US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, under
which the amount of loss is the most weighty factor in the
determination of a defendant's sentence. The amount of loss is
either the actual loss resulting from a scheme or the "intended
loss." In sentencing a defendant under § 2B1.1, there is a circuit
split as to whether intended loss refers to the loss a defendant
subjectively intended to inflict or the loss to be reasonably
expected from the outset of the fraud.
This Comment examines the various methods of evaluating
intended loss in efforts to provide a comprehensible framework
for understanding the current disagreement among circuit
courts, with the fundamental objective of arriving at a coherent
scheme for the assessment of intended loss. I argue that
although the circuit courts-when they do recognize a conflict
over intended loss at all-often frame the disagreement in terms
of the distinction between an objective analysis and a subjective
analysis, the distinction between actual intent and constructive
intent is a more accurate way of characterizing the disagreement. Ultimately, I suggest that the optimal measure of intended
loss is reached by an inquiry that uses constructive intent to examine probable consequences. This approach measures intended
loss by determining the amount placed at risk in a scheme.
In Section I of this Comment, I explain the nature of
mortgage fraud, describing typical schemes and the losses they
produce. Section II lays out the disagreement among circuit
courts over the calculation of intended loss, explaining the dispute as it is framed by the courts and offering an alternative
framework based on the distinction between actual and
1 In response to the problem, the Department of Justice began "Operation Malicious
Mortgage," a multiagency undertaking to combat mortgage fraud through investigative
and prosecutorial efforts. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'Malicious'Mortgage Fraud:
More Than 400 Charged Nationwide (FBI June 2008), online at http/www.fbi.gov/
page2,,une08/maliciousmortgageO6l908.html (visited Oct 3, 2010).
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constructive intent. In Section III, I then discuss the extent to
which the various approaches are consonant with the Sentencing
Guidelines and with the conventional meaning of intent in criminal law, in addition to the advantages and limitations of each
inquiry. Section III concludes by suggesting that an inquiry into
the amount at risk is the optimal one in terms of both sentencing
goals and judicial administrability.
I. MORTGAGE-FRAUD SCHEMES AND THE ENSUING LOSSES

A.

Fraud-for-Profit Schemes: Industry Insider Fraud

Mortgage fraud is defined as "a material misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission relied upon by an underwriter or
lender to fund, purchase, or insure a loan."2 The principal
category of mortgage fraud is known as "industry insider fraud."
These schemes commonly utilize identity theft, straw borrowers,
and shell companies, while exploiting the expertise and authority
of industry insiders, including mortgage brokers, appraisers,
3
borrowers, real estate agents, and attorneys.
Mortgage-fraud schemes involve loan applications that are
falsified in order to make unqualified borrowers appear creditworthy, often through the use of fraudulent tax forms and bank
records in order to overstate a borrower's income. Fraudulent
appraisals are utilized in these schemes in order to obtain
loans based on inflated property values, such that the lender
does not realize that the borrower is receiving cash back from
the transaction.
Property flipping is an example of a mortgage-fraud scheme,
characterized by the purchase and quick resale-or "flip"-of
properties at artificially inflated prices. In a typical propertyflipping transaction, a flipper purchases a rundown house in a
marginal neighborhood at a low price. The flipper then purports
to make improvements to the house, but in reality makes only
temporary or cosmetic improvements, adding negligible value to
the property. A real estate agent markets the house, targeting
an unsophisticated, low-income, first-time homebuyer. In order
to obtain financing for the buyer, a mortgage broker falsifies
2 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008 Mortgage Fraud Report 'Year in Review"
(FBI 2009), online at http;/www.fbi.gov/publicationsfraud/mortgage-fraud08.htm
(visited Oct 3, 2010).
3 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FinancialCrimes Report to the Public Fiscal Year
2007, online at http;//www.fbi.gov/pubhcationsIfinancia!/fcsreport2007/fmancialcrime_
2007.htm#Mortgage (visited Oct 3, 2010).
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documents for a lending institution so the buyer qualifies for a
mortgage loan. The "improvements" are reflected in an inflated
appraisal in order to falsely represent to the lender that the
property is worth as much as the sale price, even though the actual value of the property has not increased. At the final stage of
the scam, the flipper may enlist an attorney to represent the
buyer at closing and to prepare a fraudulent title, giving the impression that the flipper has had title to the property for longer
4
than he truly has.
The entire transaction, from the flipper's purchase of the
property through closing, takes place very quickly, sometimes in
less than a week. Ultimately, the buyer is trapped with a
dilapidated house and a mortgage loan in great excess of the
value of the property, and when unable to continue making payments, the buyer defaults. At foreclosure, the lender rarely recoups the full value of the loan, since the value of the property
is considerably less than the artificially inflated appraisal value,
and the lender sustains a loss. Co-conspirators often flip
many properties within a scheme, thus destroying the property
market in a neighborhood and inflicting enormous losses on
5
lending institutions.
Alternatively, some property-flipping schemes involve transactions solely among co-conspirators. In such a case, the flipper
contracts to purchase a property at a low price. Before closing the
transaction, he creates a second contract to sell the property to a
co-conspirator at a much higher price, inflated substantially
above market value. The flipper then seeks a loan based on the
second contract through a mortgage lender or broker, and a real
estate appraiser inflates the value of the property in order to justify the loan. A mortgage lender approves the fraudulent loan
application, issues the amount of the inflated loan, and the coconspirators close both transactions on the property shortly
thereafter. The flipper pays off the original purchase price, which
only requires a small portion of the loan proceeds, and shares the
remaining cash with his co-conspirators. The flipper also defaults
on the loan almost immediately, and the property goes into foreclosure, at which point the lender finally learns the true value of
6
the property and endures a significant financial loss.

4 See United States v Cassiere,4 F3d 1006, 1010-11 (1st Cir 1993).
5 For a description of this effect and examples, see Property "Flipping': HUD's
Failure to Curb Mortgage Fraud, S Prt 107-44, 107th Cong, 1st Sess (2001).
6 Id at 5-6.
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Fraud-for-Housing Schemes

Offenders carry out the above mortgage-fraud schemes in
order to make a profit; industry insider fraud is distinct from
"fraud for housing," which consists of fraudulent loan applications that are not motivated by profit. This type of fraud involves illegal conduct on the part of the borrower only. Defendants commit fraud for housing in order to acquire property that
they intend to maintain as a homeowner, and often carry out the
fraud by making misrepresentations about their income and
other information relevant to their credit rating, in order to ob7
tain a loan that they intend to-and often do- fully repay.
II. DISAGREEMENT OVER THE ASSESSMENT OF INTENDED LOSS
AT SENTENCING

In calculating the amount of loss, the circuit courts disagree
on the meaning of "intended loss" as used in § 2B1.1. Since intended loss is defined as "the pecuniary harm that was intended
to result from the offense,"8 it is necessary to understand what it
means to intend a result; the disagreement among courts largely
hinges on two facets of the definition of intent in criminal law.
First, the element of intent may generally be satisfied by a showing that the defendant acted with the purpose or desire to cause
a particular result, or alternatively, that the defendant had the
requisite knowledge or awareness that his conduct would cause
that result; this is closely aligned with the distinction between
actual intent and constructive intent. 9 Second, in the absence of
purpose or desire, there is some ambiguity with respect to the
quality of the knowledge required to satisfy the element of
intent. While some authority suggests that intent is satisfied
merely with knowledge that a consequence is probable, other
authority urges that intent requires knowledge that a consequence is practically certain. 10
The circuit courts usually give meaning to intended loss with
either an objective or subjective analysis, but the conflict may be
more accurately characterized with reference to the distinction
between constructive intent and actual intent. A defendant
7 FBI, FinancialCrimes Report to the Public (cited in note 3).

s USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n 3(A)(ii) (2009).
9 United States v United States Gypsum Company, 438 US 422, 445 (1978).
10 See United States v Baum, 555 F3d 1129, 1135 (10th Cir 2009) ("[It is an unsettled question whether intended loss requires knowledge that the loss is a virtual certainty
or only knowledge that the loss is probable."); Gypsum, 438 US at 444.
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constructively intends to cause a result when his conduct can be
reasonably expected to cause that result, and in turn, actual
intent is presumed.1"
The First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits sanction the use of a
defendant's constructive intent in order to establish intended
loss. Under this approach, intended loss refers to "the loss the
defendant reasonably expected to occur at the time he perpetrated the fraud."12 The consideration of a defendant's constructive intent permits courts to determine intended loss by
computing expected loss; "intended loss is the amount of money
that the defendant places at risk as a result of the fraudulent
loan application."1 3 The First Circuit is the only court to explicitly reject a subjective inquiry in favor of an objective one, focusing
on the "objectively reasonable expectation of a person in [the
defendant's] position at the time he perpetrated the fraud, not on
his subjective intentions or hopes." 14 The Seventh and Eighth
Circuits define intended loss in terms of subjective intent,15 but
allow this intent to be satisfied by objective evidence: "The
determination of intended loss under the Sentencing Guidelines
[ ] focuses on the conduct of the defendant and the objective
16
financial risk to victims caused by that conduct."
In contrast, the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits do not
approve of using constructive intent to substantiate an intended
loss. The Second and Third Circuits hold that "[i]ntended loss
11

Black's Law Dictionary825 (West 8th ed 2004).
12 United States v Innarelli,524 F3d 286, 290 (1st Cir 2008). See also United States v
Staples, 410 F3d 484, 490 (8th Cir 2005).
13 United States v Lane, 323 F3d 568, 585 (7th Cir 2003). See also United States v
McCoy, 508 F3d 74, 79 (1st Cir 2007) (noting that "expected loss" would be a better term
for intended loss).
14 Innarelli,524 F3d at 291.
15 See United States v Middlebrook, 553 F3d 572, 578 (7th Cir 2009) (requiring the
court to "consider the defendant's subjective intent"); Staples, 410 F3d at 490 (stating
that intended loss is "the loss the defendant intended to cause to the victim"); United
States v Wells, 127 F3d 739, 746 (8th Cir 1997) ("Where there is evidence of the extent of
the loss the defendant intended to cause ... the crucial question for determining intended
loss for sentencing purposes is the loss that the defendant actually intended to cause.");
United States v Schneider, 930 F2d 555, 559 (7th Cir 1991) (emphasizing whether a
defendant has any "intention of repaying [the] loans").
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits incorporate both objective and subjective elements
into the intended loss inquiry. These courts generally require proof that the defendant
.realistically intended a particular loss, or that a loss in that amount was probable."
United States v Williams, 292 F3d 681, 686 (10th Cir 2002). See also United States v
McCormac, 309 F3d 623, 629 (9th Cir 2002) (assessing a defendant's realistic intent
based on "intended financial harm" instead of his "intent to repay"), citing Williams, 292
F3d at 686.
16 Lane, 323 F3d at 590.
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refers to the defendant's subjective expectation, not to the risk of
loss to which he may have exposed his victims." 17 This approach
refuses to equate potential loss or expected loss with intended
loss, requiring something more than knowledge of probable consequences.1 8 The Fifth Circuit similarly requires proof of a
defendant's "actual, not constructive, intent." 9
A.

Amount of Loss under § 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines

The Guidelines Sentencing Range ("GSR") for a defendant
convicted of a financial or property offense covered by § 2B1.1 is
determined by several factors, the most important of which is an
increase in offense level for the amount of loss resulting from the
offense. 20 Under the Guidelines, loss is the greater of "actual
loss" or "intended loss."21
The Guidelines instruct that actual loss is "the reasonably
foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense,"
which means "the pecuniary harm that the defendant knew or,
under the circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a
potential result of the offense." 22 Where a defendant has pledged
collateral, the court is to credit the value of the collateral-either
the amount recovered through the sale of collateral, or the fair
market value of the collateral at the time of sentencing-against
the loss. 23 In a mortgage-fraud scheme, the actual loss is generally the gross amount of fraudulently obtained mortgage loans,
minus the sum of any payments on the loans before the defendant's arrest and the sales prices of properties sold at fore-

17 United States v Yeaman, 194 F3d 442, 460 (3d Cir 1999). See also United States v
Confredo, 528 F3d 143, 152 (2d Cir 2008) (requiring proof of "subjective intent").
18 See Baum, 555 F3d at 1133; Confredo, 528 F3d at 152 ("[T]he defendant should
have an opportunity to persuade the sentencing judge that the loss he intended was less
than the face amount of the loans."); United States v Kopp, 951 F2d 521, 536 (3d Cir 1991)
(holding that "loss" should not be equated with the full amount of loans or "potential loss
as measured at the time of the crime").
19 United States v Goss, 549 F3d 1013, 1017 (5th Cir 2008). See also United States v
Sanders, 343 F3d 511, 527 (5th Cir 2003) (requiring proof of a defendant's "subjective
intent to cause the loss that is used to calculate his offense level").
20 USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2009).
21 USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n 3(A) (2009). Alternatively, the Guidelines permit a court to
use the gain that resulted from the fraud as a measure of loss "only if there is a loss but it
reasonably cannot be determined." USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n 3(B) (2009). A sentencing court
"need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss" based on available information. USSG
§ 2B1.1 cmt n 3(C) (2009).
22 USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n 3(A)(i), (iv) (2009).
23 USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n 3(E)(ii) (2009).
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closure. 24 When foreclosure sales have not taken place, actual
loss is the amount of loans minus the fair market value of the
collateral at the time of sentencing, usually estimated by an
25
appraisal of the property.
Intended loss, on the other hand, is defined as "the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense," including
such harm "that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur
(e.g., as in a government sting operation, or an insurance fraud
in which the claim exceeded the insured value)." 26 This language
does not provide a formula to be used in calculating intended
loss, and courts have not been altogether consistent in interpreting this instruction, with respect to the meaning of "intended"
and the inclusion of impossible losses.
The Guidelines are premised upon the notion that when a
defendant is convicted of a federal offense, his sentence should
correlate with the "nature and magnitude of the loss caused or
intended" by the crime; "loss serves as a measure of the seriousness of the offense and the defendant's relative culpability and is
a principal factor in determining the offense level under
[§ 2B1.1]." 27 Loss controls the analysis; the fact that a defendant
does not profit from his fraud does not preclude a victim from
28
suffering a loss, nor does it preclude a sentencing enhancement.
Further, the Guidelines instruct that in the case of criminal
activity jointly undertaken by the defendant and others, the
relevant conduct of all participants in the scheme should be included in the amount of loss. 29 Consequently, the amount of loss
for which a defendant is responsible is not limited to the proceeds pocketed by the defendant himself, but includes the loss
produced by the entire scheme, so long as the result was reasonably foreseeable. 30 Because of the nature of the crime of mortgage
fraud, offenders often operate within a scheme, so it is crucial
to recognize relevant conduct for which a defendant may be
held responsible.

24 See, for example, United States v Wilkins, 2009 WL 211812, *7 (6th Cir).
25 See, for example, United States v Parish,565 F3d 528, 535 (8th Cir 2009); United
States v Crandall, 525 F3d 907, 914-15 (9th Cir 2008) (describing various ways to
measure the fair market value of collateral in fraud involving real property).
26 USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n 3(A)(ii) (2009).
27 USSG § 2B1.1 background (2009).
28 United States v Fazio, 487 F3d 646, 658 (8th Cir 2007).
29 USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2004).
30 Wilkins, 2009 WL 211812, at *7.
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The Sentencing Guidelines are advisory; a sentence is reviewed on appeal for reasonableness under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. 3 1 Even though they are no longer mandatory, the Guidelines remain an important part of sentencing. An
appeals court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of
reasonableness to sentences imposed within the correctly calculated GSR.32 The standard of review requires an appellate
court to
ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range ....Assuming that
the district court's sentencing decision is procedurally
sound, the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an
33
abuse-of-discretion standard.
This means that despite the advisory nature of the Guidelines, a
district court is still required to properly calculate the GSR for
its determination of the sentence to impose; "the Guidelines
should be the starting point and initial benchmark." 34 Additionally, the commentary accompanying a guideline has the same
35
authority as the guideline itself.
B.

Constructive Intent: Reasonable Expectations of Loss

The distinction between fraud for profit and fraud for housing, particularly with respect to a defendant's purpose in committing each offense, is helpful in understanding intended loss.
In fraud for profit, a defendant makes misrepresentations in
order to acquire a loan from which he intends to make a profit by
failing to repay at least a portion of the loan, or abandoning the
loan secured by collateral of insufficient value; his failure to repay inflicts a loss, usually on the lender. In fraud for housing, a
defendant makes misrepresentations in order to acquire a loan
that he sincerely intends and-in some cases, reasonably31 United States v Booker, 543 US 220, 261 (2005).
32 Rita v United States, 551 US 338, 347 (2007).
33 Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 51 (2007).
34 Id at 49.
35 Stinson v United States, 508 US 36, 38 (1993) ("[C]ommentary in the Guidelines
Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading
of, that guideline.").
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expects to repay, but for some reason, he would not have been
eligible for the loan without the misrepresentations.
This distinction has often been described on a more general
level by the circuit courts:
[I]t is necessary to distinguish between two types of fraud.
One is where the offender-a true con artist ... -does
not intend to perform his undertaking, the contract or
whatever; he means to pocket the entire contract price
without rendering any service in return. In such a case
the contract price is a reasonable estimate of what we are
calling the expected loss .... The other type of fraud is
committed in order to obtain a contract that the defendant might otherwise not obtain, but he means to perform
the contract (and is able to do so).36
While the broader distinction is not a perfect comparison, it is a
useful one because it sheds light on intended loss. In fraud for
profit, the defendant is a con artist, but because in most cases
there is collateral pledged to secure the loan, he does not ordinarily intend to pocket the entire contract price. Instead, he intends
to pocket the difference between the amount of the loan and the
collateral on the loan; this value is the expected loss. 37 Conversely, other defendants fraudulently applying for loans, such as in
fraud for housing, often make misrepresentations in order to obtain a loan for which they have a legitimate use, and which they
38
truly intend to repay.
The difference between perpetrators of fraud for profit and
fraud for housing elucidates the relationship between subjective
intent and objective expectations. It is fundamental that the con
artist has a very different subjective intent from the perpetrator
who intends to perform the contract by repaying the loan. Likewise, the objective financial risk and reasonable expectations of
losses are greater in the case of the con artist, who has no reason
36 Schneider, 930 F2d at 558. See also United States v Trnana, 468 F3d 308, 322 (6th
Cir 2006); United States v Blastos, 258 F3d 25, 30 (1st Cir 2001); United States v Edgar,
971 F2d 89, 95 (8th Cir 1992); United States v Smith, 951 F2d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir 1991).
37 See United States v Lauer, 148 F3d 766, 768 (7th Cir 1998) ("In [fraudulent loan
application] cases the loss is the part of the loan that the defendant does not intend to
repay, or the value of the part of the contractual performance that he intends to omit,
rather than the entire loan or entire contract price.").
38 See, for example, United States v Erpenbeck, 532 F3d 423, 432 (6th Cir 2008) (observing that the defendant "was attempting to temporarily resolve his cash-flow problem"); United States v Oligmueller, 198 F3d 669, 670 (8th Cir 1999) (noting the defendant's "extraordinary efforts to insure that his debt was repaid to the bank").
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to expect anything but the maximum potential loss. The efforts of
the defrauder who retains control over the collateral and does
not abandon repayment suggest that it is reasonable to expect a
loss of less than the potential loss; since he is not a con artist, his
control over the situation and expectations of repayment also
serve to mitigate the amount at risk in his fraud.
As such, the subjective standard announced by the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits aligns with the First Circuit's objective
approach; these courts focus on a defendant's subjective intent
only when the defendant's subjective intent to repay a fraudulent
loan is consistent with reasonable expectations of repayment.3 9
The assessment must take into account the defendant's conduct
40
alongside the objective risk caused by the conduct.
In calculating intended loss through an evaluation of expected loss, the unsecured portion of the loan-the gross amount
of the fraudulent loan, offset by the value of the collateral-is a
"common-sense estimate of the interim risk faced by the lending
institution."4 1 When there is no evidence that a defendant intended to cause any less than the greatest possible loss-the
amount at risk-"the amount of loss for sentencing purposes ...
is found by determining the intended loss as measured by the
possible loss."42 This approach computes intended loss "from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the defendant's position at
the time of the fraud," looking at what a reasonable person would
43
have expected.
The measure of the loss that the defendant intended to inflict-"the increased risk from lending excessive amounts of
39 See McCoy, 508 F3d at 79 (explaining that intended loss could be zero where "the
defendant sincerely intended and reasonably expected fully to repay the loan"), citing
Schneider,930 F2d at 559.
40 Lane, 323 F3d at 590.
41 Id at 586. See also United States v Miller, 588 F3d 560, 566-67 (8th Cir 2009).
42 Wells, 127 F3d at 746. See also Staples, 410 F3d at 490 (noting that the maximum
amount of loss may be "circumstantial evidence of the intended loss which satisfies the
preponderance of the evidence standard").
43 Innarelli, 524 F3d at 291; Staples, 410 F3d at 490-91. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have in some instances engaged in this type of inquiry. See United States v
Pendergraph,388 F3d 109, 114 (4th Cir 2004) (noting that "expected loss might provide
evidence of whether the defendant intended any loss," but also that "the absence of intended loss renders expectations irrelevant under the guideline"); United States v Baum,
974 F2d 496, 499 (4th Cir 1992) (holding that when the defendant induces a lender to
subject itself to a greater risk of default, even if the defendant intends to fully repay the
loan, loss is measured by the potential consequences of default); United States v Smith,
2006 WL 2385338, *4 (ND Ohio) (holding that intended loss is the maximum loss that a
reasonable person in the defendant's position could have intended), affd, 2007 WL
2088686 (6th Cir).
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money on the collateral"-is the amount by which the fraudulent
loan exceeds the amount that the lender would have lent in the
absence of the fraud, having known the true facts. 44 Generally,
courts compute this amount on the assumption that had there
been no misrepresentations, the amount of the loan would be
equal to the value of the collateral. Accordingly, the expected loss
equals the difference between the amount of the fraudulent loan
and the expected value of the property, a proxy for the value of
the collateral. The rationale for using the expected value of each
property is that a defendant causes loans in amounts greater
than the value of the underlying collateral to end up in the hands
of individuals who are often neither qualified for the loans nor
concerned with repayment. Therefore, in property flipping or
other fraud for profit, the defendant has no reasonable basis to
expect that the mortgage payments will be made; he can only
45
expect lenders to recover the value of the mortgaged properties.
A proxy for the value of the collateral should be determined
from the outset of the fraud. 46 Depending on the circumstances of
the offense, courts measuring expected loss tend to choose the
most appropriate of the original purchase price, an accurate
appraisal value, and the sale price.
The flipper's original purchase price is often used as the expected value of each property in a property-flipping scheme. As
these schemes take place very quickly, a defendant's reasonable
expectation at the time of the fraud is unaffected by changes in
the property's value during the course of the scheme before the
actual loss is realized. 47 The First Circuit calculated intended
44 United States v Carter, 412 F3d 864, 869 (8th Cir 2005). See also Kok v United
States, 17 F3d 247, 250 (8th Cir 1994) (measuring intended loss as "the difference
between the amount of credit the bank extended based on the false representations and
the amount of credit the bank would have extended had it known the [borrower's] true
financial condition"); United States v Chorney, 63 F3d 78, 83 (1st Cir 1995) ("Where a
bank loan is fraudulently procured, the original loan or the outstanding balance is a presumptive proxy for the actual or threatened loss. Reducing that amount by the value of
assets pledged to the lender reflects the fact that the real sum at risk for the lender is the
difference between the amount loaned and the collateral.").
45 Lane, 323 F3d at 590 ("This estimate of loss similarly has the advantage of not
making the term of a criminal sentence turn on conjecture.... This determination also
applies even when the amount at risk was not lost.") (quotation marks omitted).
46 Id at 590 n 8 ("[Flor intended loss purposes courts should examine the status quo
at the time the fraudulent loan application is made."). See also Miller, 588 F3d at 566
(focusing on the amounts that lenders would have issued had they known the borrowers'
true financial conditions, examining the outset of the fraud).
47 See McCoy, 508 F3d at 79 ("[The flippers] had no knowledge of how long it would
take before the innocent buyers defaulted and their properties were foreclosed on by
lenders and resold. That this took long enough that some properties went up in market
price (and others down) has nothing to do with culpability."); United States v Barren,
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loss this way in United States v Innarelli,48 where the propertyflipping scheme involved collusion among buyers, mortgage
brokers, appraisers, and a lawyer. Some of the properties
appreciated in value during the scheme, such that the lender
recovered the full amount of the mortgage loan through sale at
foreclosure, and some of the buyers of flipped properties continued making payments on the inflated mortgage loans and did
not default; in consequence, there was no actual loss with respect
to these properties. The First Circuit calculated the intended loss
for each property by subtracting the property flippers' purchase
49
price from the amount of the mortgage loan on the property.
The court held that it was immaterial that the defendant never
subjectively intended to cause such a loss, or that many of the
lenders suffered no actual losses: "Where, as here, the defendant
reasonably should have expected that loss would result, he can
and generally should be punished more severely to account for
his greater level of moral culpability, even where the victim has
50
managed to make money in spite of the fraud."
The Seventh Circuit examined intended loss in a similar
property-flipping scheme, explaining that in that case, the foreclosure price was the appropriate substitute for the value of the
collateral. In United States v Radziszewski,5 1 the defendant and
other plotters flipped the same property several times, hiring
individuals with good credit to provide false documentation for
loan applications. 52 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the computation of intended loss as the difference between the amount of
the loan that the victim bank intended to issue for the resale of
the property, which had already been flipped, and the amount
recovered by the lender through foreclosure. 53 The court rejected
2008 WL 5070310, *4 (ND Ill) ("It was reasonable for the court, in order to determine [the
defendant's] culpability at the time of the fraud, to conclude that the amount [the defendant] paid for the property was an accurate approximation of the fair market value of the
properties only a short time later.").
48 524 F3d 286 (1st Cir 2008).
49 Id at 291. See also McCoy, 508 F3d at 79 (measuring intended loss in a propertyflipping scheme by subtracting the price at which the property was purchased from the
amount of the fraudulently inflated mortgage loan); Barren, 2008 WL 5070310, at *4
(same); United States v Aihe, 2004 WL 2434713, *3 (D Minn) (same).
50 Innarelli,524 F3d at 291. See also United States v Helfand, 2008 WL 2368963, *10
(7th Cir) ("[A] fraud victim's effort to mitigate its losses does not lessen the wrongdoer's
liability.-).
51 474 F3d 480 (7th Cir 2007).
52 Id at 482.

53 Id at 487. See also Helfand, 2008 WL 2368963, at *6 (using the difference between
the mortgage loan and the amount recovered at resale for intended loss when there was
no actual loss).
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the defendant's proposal to use an appraisal of the house as a
proxy for collateral, since the appraisal value was greater than
the foreclosure price and more speculative. Since there were
several transactions on the same property, the foreclosure price
served as the best estimate of the property's value at the time of
54
the fraudulent sale.
Using the same methodology, the Eighth Circuit calculated
intended loss in a different type of fraud-for-profit scheme in
United States v Carter.55 The perpetrators of the mortgage-fraud
scheme worked in the loan brokerage business, and they falsified
documentation of sales prices and of borrowers' financial means
in order to obtain fraudulently inflated loans in greater amounts
than the lenders would have otherwise lent to the particular
borrowers, who had poor credit, or on the particular houses,
which were not as valuable as they were represented to be. 56 The
defendant diverted the excess funds on each fraudulent mortgage
loan from the closing and title company to another company controlled by him. The Eighth Circuit observed that the intended
loss could be estimated as the amount by which the defendant
caused the loans to be overfunded; "the amount disbursed to [the
defendant's company] on each loan was the same amount as that
by which the fraudulently-obtained loan exceeded the amount
that the lenders would have lent on the property had they known
its true value." 57 There was neither evidence that any mortgages
had been foreclosed upon, nor evidence providing a basis for actual loss calculations, so the court explained that the amount
diverted by the defendant-the sum of the excess amounts on all
of the loans-was "a good proxy for the lenders' likely losses on
58
the loans."
The Eleventh Circuit, too, finds the fact that a defendant
"intentionally induced a bank to unknowingly subject itself to the
risk of default [ ] sufficient to establish that the defendant intended to cause a loss." 59 In United States v Greene,60 the defendant participated in a mortgage-fraud scheme in which he secured

51 Radziszewski, 474 F3d at 487.
55 412 F3d 864 (8th Cir 2005).
56 Id at 866.
57 Id at 869.
58 Id at 870.

59 United States v Menichino, 989 F2d 438, 442 (11th Cir 1993) (rejecting the contention that the government had to show that the defendant believed the loan would not
be repaid), citing Baum, 974 F2d at 496.
60 2008 WL 2222044 (1lth Cir).
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loans for unqualified buyers through the establishment of shell
companies, inflated appraisals of properties, and credit information of straw buyers. 61 On appeal, the court addressed the intended loss calculations concerning two properties. On the first,
the mortgage lender made a profit because the property was sold
at foreclosure for a price higher than the amount of the original
loan. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's calculation, which measured intended loss by using the purchase
price "as a proxy for fair market value." 62 On the second property, the court affirmed the district court's use of the appraisal
value, holding that under the Guidelines, loss should be determined based on "available information." Since the property had
not been foreclosed upon, the appraisal value was the only information; actual loss could not be determined, so it was proper
63
to use intended loss instead.
C.

Actual Intent: Subjective Intent to Inflict a Particular Loss

In contrast, several circuit courts hold that the amount put
at risk by the defendant's scheme is not an appropriate measure
of intended loss. 6 4 The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits require
evidence that a defendant subjectively intended to inflict a loss,
refusing to equate intended loss with an objective measure of
expected loss, potential loss, or the amount at risk: "Intended
loss refers to the defendant's subjective expectation, not to the
risk of loss to which he may have exposed his victims." 65 The
Third Circuit has emphasized that there is a distinction between
intending a loss and expecting a loss. 66 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit requires that the government show that a defendant intended to not repay an amount for that amount to constitute intended
loss, holding that actual loss must be used as the amount of loss
61 Id at *2.
62 Id at *6.

63 Id at *20-21. See also United States v Fraza, 106 F3d 1050, 1055 (1st Cir 1997)
(measuring loss by deducting a property's appraisal value from the amount of mortgage
loans); USSG § 2B1. 1 cmt n 3(C) (2009) ("The estimate of the loss shall be based on available information.").
64 See, for example, United States v Ravelo, 370 F3d 266, 270-71 (2d Cir 2004);
Yeaman, 194 F3d at 460; United States v Orton, 73 F3d 331, 334-35 (11th Cir 1996).
65 Yeaman, 194 F3d at 460 (remarking that the defendants hoped their scheme would
continue indefinitely). See also Confredo, 528 F3d at 151-52, citing Yeaman, 194 F3d at
460; Goss, 549 F3d at 1017 (focusing on "actual, not constructive, intent"); Kopp, 951 F2d
at 529.
66 United States v Geevers, 226 F3d 186, 188 (3d Cir 2000). See also Kopp, 951 F2d at
529 (observing "a critical distinction between actual, probable, and intended loss").
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when there is no evidence of a defendant's intent not to repay. 67
Under this inquiry, it is inappropriate to consider the amount of
a loan that a defendant received or intended to receive as a factor
68
in determining intended loss.
In United States v Baum, 6 9 the Tenth Circuit commented
that the "question whether intended loss requires knowledge
that the loss is a virtual certainty or only knowledge that the loss
is probable" was unsettled. The court noted the significance of
this issue, as it could have been dispositive in that case-the
evidence supported a finding that the calculated amount of
intended loss was a probable consequence, but not a virtual
certainty. 70 The effect of the disagreement among circuit courts is
illuminated by a comparison of the loss calculations carried out
by the courts.
The Second Circuit considered the magnitude of intended
loss resulting from a fraudulent loan application scheme in
United States v Confredo.71 The defendant, a former loan officer,
prepared and submitted hundreds of fraudulent loan applications in order to obtain loans for borrowers with poor credit. The
district court found that intended loss was the proper figure for a
sentencing enhancement, which it calculated to be the combined
face value of the loan applications that the defendant had submitted, since that amount was greater than the actual loss resulting from the scheme. 72 The defendant contended that he did
not intend such a large loss, on the basis that he expected some
of the loan applications to be rejected and expected some of the
borrowers to make payments on the fraudulent loans; he supported his claim by pointing to his experience as a loan officer in
addition to what had actually happened-the resulting actual

67 Sanders, 343 F3d at 527. See also Goss, 549 F3d at 1017 (noting that in the absence of evidence that a defendant intended to cause the loss of the loans or that he intended that they be repaid, the court examines whether a defendant was so "consciously
indifferent or reckless about the repayment of the loans as to impute to him the intention
that the lenders should not recoup their loans") (quotation marks omitted).
6s The Fifth Circuit's analysis tends to facilitate either a complete rejection of intended loss, or a result attributing the full amount of the loans to intended loss, on the
basis that the defendant did not intend to repay any of the loans. See Sanders, 343 F3d at
526 (justifying the rarity of sentences based on intended loss in the Fifth Circuit).
69 555 F3d 1129 (10th Cir 2009).
70 Id at 1135 (affirming the intended loss calculation based on probable loss under a
plain error standard, without providing an answer with respect to the knowledge required for intent).
71 528 F3d 143 (2d Cir 2008).

72 Id at 146.
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loss. 73 Holding that "the defendant should have an opportunity to
persuade the sentencing judge that the loss he intended was less
than the face amount of the loans," the Second Circuit remanded
the case for reconsideration of the defendant's sentence. The
court explained that the intended loss should be based only on
what the defendant subjectively intended to occur as a con74
sequence of his fraud.
The principal difference between Confredo and many
mortgage-fraud schemes is the absence of collateral to secure the
loans in Confredo; this is of little weight. 75 As the district court
remarked:
[The defendant] undertook no obligation himself to pay off
the loans he secured. His 'cut' was paid when the loans
were secured; it did not matter whether they were paid
back. [The defendant] is not a borrower who used fraud to
76
obtain a loan which he then paid back in full.
This framework of analysis, rejected by the Second Circuit,
77
seems to be consistent with the approach taken by other courts.
In spite of this, the appellate court made no mention of the
reasonableness of the defendant's expectations-only his subjective intent. Even so, the defendant's conduct indicates that his
intent was aligned with that of the con artist as opposed to the
defrauder who intends to fully repay his loans. Under the First,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits' approach, the fact that the defendant had no control over repayment, that he personally profited
from the scheme, and that he continued to arrange fraudulent
loans while on bail after his arrest, would likely convince a court
that there was no basis for reasonable expectations of
repayment. This objective inquiry would likely hold the defendant's subjective intent to be wholly irrelevant because it was so
73 Id at 149.
74 Id at 152, citing Kopp, 951 F2d at 533.
75 The fraudulent loans at issue in Confredo were not secured by collateral. The
Second Circuit's discussion of "credit for objective facts" is based on the application note
accompanying § 2B1.1, which directs a sentencing court to credit the collateral against
the loss. Since there was no collateral, unless the court was calculating actual loss-in
which case it would offset the loss by the amount repaid by borrowers-this application
note would not seem to apply to the defendant. Additionally, it was very clear that the
court was discussing intended loss, not actual loss. See Confredo, 528 F3d at 151; USSG
§ 2F1.1 cmt n 7(b) (1997).
76 Confredo, 528 F3d at 148.
77 See United States v McBride, 362 F3d 360, 375 (6th Cir 2004) (explaining that the
disparity between actual loss and intended loss should only be considered when deciding
whether a departure is warranted).
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inconsistent with the objective financial risk resulting from
78
the scheme.
In United States v Goss, 79 the Fifth Circuit examined the loss
resulting from a mortgage-fraud scheme that was aimed at inducing lenders to make loans to borrowers who may not have
qualified for them otherwise. The defendant was a mortgage
lender who prepared false documents-false verifications of
deposit and rent, IRS W-2 forms, and Social Security benefit
letters-and provided them to lenders to obtain mortgages.80 The
Fifth Circuit observed that there was no evidence that the defendant intended to cause the loss of the loans, nor that he intended that the loans be repaid, and held that even though the
defendant did not have control over repayment, he was not so
"consciously indifferent or reckless" about the repayment as to
8
impute to him the intention that the loans not be repaid. ' Consequently, the court held that actual loss was the appropriate
calculation, refusing to consider intended loss.8 2 This approach is
not concerned with risk, but rather with subjective intent. However, it is difficult to ascertain the point at which the Fifth Circuit finds conscious indifference or recklessness regarding repayment; the defendant in Goss was the perpetrator of a
mortgage-fraud scheme carried out for profit, he had no control
over repayment, and he actually did profit from the scheme.
In United States v Breon,8 3 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's calculation of the defendant's sentence for his participation in a property-flipping scheme, in which he flipped a
property three times. One of the loans fraudulently obtained by
the defendant was fully repaid by a subsequent flip of the property, so there was no actual loss on that transaction; the district
78 Compare Wells, 127 F3d at 747 ("[W]here there is no indication that the defendant
intended to cause less than the greatest possible loss, the intended loss is the possible
loss."), with Confredo, 528 F3d at 146; Sanders, 343 F3d at 525 (holding that a measure of
intended loss was inappropriate because the defendant asserted that he intended to repay
his loan, and because there was no "evidence indicating his intent not to repay"). But see
United States v Morrow, 177 F3d 272, 301-02 (5th Cir 1999) (inferring the defendants'
conscious indifference or recklessness about the repayment of loans, which warranted the
use of intended loss measured by the full amount of loans); United States v Tedder, 81
F3d 549, 551 (5th Cir 1996) (using the full amount of loans as intended loss, finding it
highly unlikely that the defendant intended to repay the loans).
79 549 F3d 1013 (5th Cir 2008).
80 Id at 1014.

81 Id at 1018. But see Morrow, 177 F3d at 301 (finding the defendants "consciously
indifferent or reckless" about repayment where the defendants had no control over repayment, and calculating intended loss).
82 Goss, 549 F3d at 1018.
83 2009 WL 4885190 (5th Cir).
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court found that the only actual or intended loss was to one lender relating to the third flip of the property.8 4 This sentence does
not seem to reflect the amount at risk in the defendant's scheme,
which would require an assessment from the outset of the fraud;
the fact that a result actually occurred is not necessarily proof
that the result could have been reasonably expected.
III. DECIPHERING THE VARIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF INTENDED LOSS
A.

Conventional Understandings of Intended Loss and Intent

In order to evaluate the various interpretations of intended
loss, the history of the relevant section of the Guidelines provides
some assistance. The Sentencing Guidelines took effect in 1987.85
Under the original Guidelines, a defendant convicted of mortgage
fraud was sentenced under § 2F1.1, while a defendant convicted
of theft was sentenced under § 2B1.1.8 6 Until 1991, the relevant
commentary provided the definition of intended loss as "probable
or intended loss."87 A 1991 amendment deleted the word
"probable" from this definition, leaving only "intended loss."88 In
2001, an amendment deleted an application note that provided:
In fraudulent loan application cases and contract procurement cases, the loss is the actual loss to the victim (or
if the loss has not yet come about, the expected loss)....
However, where the intended loss is greater than the
89
actual loss, the intended loss is to be used.
Also in 2001, former § 2F1.1 was combined with former § 2B1.1,
yielding the current § 2B1.1, which applies to both fraud
and theft. 90
Although there is no longer any reference to expected loss or
probable loss in the relevant section of the Guidelines, it does not
necessarily follow that the current language of § 2B1.1 precludes
an objective inquiry into the reasonable expectations of someone

84 Id at *2 (affi-ming the district court's calculation of loss, even though it did not
clarify whether it had calculated actual loss, intended loss, or gain, since "its estimate
reasonably could have been based on any of the three methods").
85 USSG ch 1, part A.
86 USSG § 2B1.1 (2000); USSG § 2F1.1 (2000).
87 USSG § 2F1.1 cmt n 7 (1990).
88 USSG app C, amend 393 (1991).
89 USSG § 2F1.1 cmt n 8(b) (2000); USSG app C, amend 617 (2001).
90 USSG app C, amend 617 (2001).

THE UNIVERSITY OFCHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2010:

in the defendant's position.91 Courts have often defended a
standard for intended loss that can be equated with an inquiry
into expected loss by pointing to the "common-law rule that a
person is presumed to have generally intended the natural and
92
probable consequences of his or her actions."
The Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard of
intent in criminal law in United States v United States Gypsum
Company.93 Although the decision does not contain a solution to
the current disagreement regarding intended loss, it does provide
guidance. The Court examined whether proof of intent required
that the "conduct was undertaken with the conscious object of
producing such effects," or whether it was sufficient that the
conduct was "undertaken with knowledge that the proscribed
effects would most likely follow." 94 In Gypsum, the Court
held that evidence of "action undertaken with knowledge of its
95
probable consequences" was sufficient to demonstrate intent.
The Court explained:
Generally [the] limited distinction between knowledge
and purpose has not been considered important since
there is good reason for imposing liability whether the
defendant desired or merely knew of the practical certainty of the results.

Where carefully planned and calculated conduct is being
scrutinized in the context of a criminal prosecution, the
perpetrator's knowledge of the anticipated consequences
96
is a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal intent.
Gypsum makes clear that a finding of intent does not require
evidence of purpose or desire so long as a defendant had the
requisite knowledge, but the Court did not announce a standard
for that level of knowledge. Instead, the Court used varied
language with respect to a defendant's knowledge: knowledge
of "likely" effects; knowledge of "anticipated" consequences;
91

See Baum, 555 F3d at 1134.
92 United States v Alli, 444 F3d 34, 38 (1st Cir 2006) (holding that reasonably foreseeable loss constitutes intended loss). See also Gypsum, 438 US at 430.
93 438 US 422 (1978).
94 Id at 444.
95 Id.
96 Id at 445-46, quoting W. LaFave and A. Scott, CriminalLaw 197 (1972) (quotation
marks omitted).
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knowledge of "probable" consequences or that the results "would
most likely follow"; and knowledge that the consequences were
"practically certain to follow." 9 7
While the Tenth Circuit has remarked that there is "substantial support for a view contrary to ... that of the First Cir98
cuit, which said that a loss is intended if it is expected," most
circuit courts continue to examine probable loss in their discussion of intended loss, at least in some instances, using language that strongly suggests that a loss need not be practically
certain to follow from the defendant's conduct in order to con99
stitute an intended loss.
B.

The Economic Reality Doctrine

The "economic reality doctrine" is the proposition that if the
possible loss resulting from a fraud is less than the intended loss,
the possible loss should govern.1 00 In light of the current formulation of intended loss under § 2B1.1, clearly including intended
harm "that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g.,
as in a government sting operation, or an insurance fraud in
which the claim exceeded the insured value)," it is generally
agreed that the economic reality doctrine no longer has a place in
the determination of intended loss. 10 1
97 Gypsum, 438 US at 444-46.
98 Baum, 555 F3d at 1136, citing McCoy, 508 F3d at 79, and referring to Gypsum, 438
US at 445-46.
99 See, for example, United States v Gallant,537 F3d 1202, 1236-37 (10th Cir 2008)
("[f there [is] no actual loss or if a probable or intended loss [is] greater than the actual
loss, the larger figure will be used."); Alli, 444 F3d at 38 (holding that a "reasonable
expectation, if not knowledge... [is] enough ... to demonstrate intended loss," following
"the common-law rule that a person is presumed to have generally intended the natural
and probable consequences of his or her actions"); United States v Harms, 442 F3d 367,
380 (5th Cir 2006) ("[Ljoss for purposes of the Guidelines [is] the actual, intended, or
probable loss to the victims."), quoting United States v Parsons, 109 F3d 1002, 1004 (4th
Cir 1997); United States v Canova, 412 F3d 331, 354 (2d Cir 2005) ("[llntended loss is
tantamount to the probable loss from a particular misstatement because one is presumed
to intend the natural and probable consequences of one's acts."); United States v Miller,
316 F3d 495, 499 (4th Cir 2003) ("[L]oss calculations may include actual, probable, or
intended loss to the victims.") (quotation marks omitted); Lane, 323 F3d at 589 ("[lIt is
enough if [a loss] is probable or intended."); United States v Piggie, 303 F3d 923, 927 (8th
Cir 2002) (holding that the amount of loss may be based on losses "intended as the
natural and probable consequences of the defendant's actions").
100 See United States v Merritt, 2004 WL 1418432, *6 n 7 (4th Cir).
101 Id; USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n 3(A)(ii) (2009). See also Ravelo, 370 F3d at 270-71 ("The
definition of 'intended loss' now makes clear, however, that a loss may be intended
irrespective of whether it could actually occur."); McBride, 362 F3d at 375 (explaining
that economic reality-whether a loss is possible-may warrant a downward departure
but is not an appropriate consideration in the intended loss calculation). But see Smith,
2006 WL 2385338, at *4 ("[For an amount of loss to be considered for purposes of
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Several circuit courts have gone a step further, holding that
§ 2B1.1 must also preclude a measure of intended loss based on
the amount at risk. 102 While the criticism of an approach endorsing a "policy of punishing criminals in light of economic reality or
amounts put at risk,"10 3 is consistent with the prevailing dismissal of the economic reality doctrine, the rationale for rejecting
an inquiry into the amount at risk altogether does not seem to be
equally defensible. These courts reject the inquiry on the basis
that considering the amount at risk necessarily limits the
inquiry to losses that are "realistic or possible," imposing an
impossibility or improbability limitation on intended losses,
04
which is contrary to the language of § 2B1.1.1
This reliance on the demise of the economic reality doctrine
in loss calculations in order to assert the irrelevance of the
amount at risk seems to misunderstand the alternative approach
that continues to examine the amount at risk. Specifically, when
courts reject giving weight to the amount at risk, they do so because they view an inquiry that examines possible or potential
consequences as a narrow one. The Second Circuit, for example,
understands the amount at risk or the potential loss as restricted
literally to the actual amount each victim stood to lose. On this
view, the narrow inquiry into the amount at risk stands in stark
contrast to the Second Circuit's broad inquiry into all intended
losses, whether likely or unlikely, possible or impossible. 10 5 Quite
the reverse, courts that use the amount at risk in order to compute intended loss view the assessment of potential consequences
as a way of expanding the inquiry beyond that which is confined
to subjective intent, in order to account for reasonable expectations or probable consequences that might not have been con10 6
templated by a defendant.
sentencing under the Guidelines ... it must have been possible for the defendant to cause
the loss.... [I]t must reflect economic reality.") (quotation marks omitted).
102 See, for example, Ravelo, 370 F3d at 271; McBride, 362 F3d at 374; Miller, 316 F3d
at 502; United States v Studevent, 116 F3d 1559, 1562 (DC Cir 1997).
103 Ravelo, 370 F3d at 271 (quotation marks omitted).
104 Miller, 316 F3d at 502 ("[Nleither the Guideline nor its commentary contains any
requirement that this intent be realistic."). See Ravelo, 370 F3d at 273 (finding that the
defendant's intended loss included all of his attempts at fraud, even though "it would
have been impossible" to cause that amount of loss); McBride, 362 F3d at 377 (refusing to
"limit [ ] intended loss to harms the defendant was actually capable of inflicting") (alteration in original); Studevent, 116 F3d at 1563 ("Limiting intended loss to that which was
likely or possible [ ] would eliminate the distinction between a defendant whose only
ambition was to make some pocket change and one who plotted a million-dollar fraud.").
105 See Ravelo, 370 F3d at 271.
106 See United States v Rhodes, 201 F Supp 2d 906, 912-13 (CD IlI 2002) ("The fact
that [the defendant] may not have intended to cause a loss [of the amount placed at risk,
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It is clear enough that § 2B1.1 regards some impossible and
unlikely losses within the ambit of intended loss. It may also be
prudent to try to take more meaning from the examples provided, namely a government sting operation and an insurance
claim in excess of the insured value. Both of these are situations
in which an external circumstance, unknown to the defendant
and over which the defendant has no control, is the sole barrier
to the defendant's successful completion of the offense. It seems
unlikely that a court giving weight to constructive intent would
conclude that there was no intended loss in either example;
neither situation affects the reasonable expectations of someone
in the defendant's position. Even though the loans would not
technically be at risk and the intended loss would be impossible,
the use of reasonable expectations ensures that economic reality
does not prevent the defendant from being sentenced in accordance with his culpability.
Although the application of the economic reality doctrine has
been discredited within the calculation of intended loss, the principle continues to serve an important function in sentencing, concerning whether a departure from the GSR computed under
§ 2B1.1 is warranted. 10 7 The commentary to § 1B1.3 authorizes
an evaluation of the relationship between the risk of harm and
the intended loss calculated under § 2B1.1:
If [ I the guideline refers only to ... actual, attempted or
intended harm (e.g., § 2B1.1 ... ) the risk created enters
into the determination of the offense level only insofar as
it is incorporated into the base offense level. Unless clearly indicated by the guidelines, harm that is merely risked
is not to be treated as the equivalent of harm that
108
occurred.
This application note explains that where the creation of risk is
not adequately accounted for in the offense level computed under
the applicable guideline, an upward departure may be appropriate.1 0 9 An upward departure may take place only after the
whether or not the full exposure of risk came to pass] is irrelevant; in fact, he probably
intended just the opposite. Nevertheless, the loss was an intended consequences of [the
defendant's] fraud."). See also United States v Stockheimer, 157 F3d 1082, 1090 (7th Cir
1998) (defending the characterization of intended loss as the amount at risk, even though
the Guidelines do not refer to the amount at risk or the possible loss).
107 See McBride, 362 F3d at 375; Stockheimer, 157 F3d at 1089; USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n
19 (2009).
10 USSG § 1B1.3 cmt n 5 (2004).
109 Id. See also USSG § 2Bl.1 cmt n 19(A)(iv) (2009) (noting that an upward departure
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amount of loss is calculated under the offense guideline and a
defendant's offense level is determined. 110
In this regard, the Sixth Circuit has observed:
Where sentencing is based largely or solely on intended
loss, a downward departure may be warranted under the
"economic reality" principle....
A court should therefore consider whether there was any
reasonable possibility that the scheme could have caused
the loss the defendant intended.... [hose who devise
ridiculous schemes (1) do not ordinarily have the same
mental state and (2) do not create the same risk of harm
as those who devise cunning schemes. In short, they are
not as dangerous. Thus, it is entirely proper to mitigate
their sentences by a departure.1 11
Hardly ever do courts addressing sentencing issues in fraud
schemes refer to the directive found in § 1B1.3 as to the treatment of risk, despite the fact that the application note concerns
the fraud guideline specifically. 112 Rather, courts discuss the propriety of a departure from the offense level determined under
§ 2B1.1 by looking into the more visible commentary accompanying § 2B1.1, which provides departure considerations, or the
11 3
extensive guidance on grounds for departure found in § 5K2.0.
It is also important in assessing the approach to calculating
intended loss taken by the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuitsfocused on the amount at risk-to note that these courts do not
misread the Guidelines' specifications regarding the treatment of
risk. Instead, these courts recognize that § 2B1.1's guidance on

may be warranted when "[tihe offense created a risk of substantial loss beyond the loss
determined for purposes of subsection (b)(1)").
110 USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n 19 (2009).
111 McBride, 362 F3d at 375 (6th Cir 2004), quoting United States v Roen, 279 F Supp
2d 986, 991 (ED Wis 2003). See also Lane, 323 F3d at 588 ("Once the amount of loss is
calculated under the guidelines, the court has the discretion to modify the amount of loss
to more accurately reflect the economic realities of the crime and the time to take economic realities into account is [at] a district court's downward departure decision.") (alteration in original), quoting United States v Downs, 123 F3d 637, 644 (7th Cir 1997).
112 Compare United States v Resurreccion, 978 F2d 759, 763 (1st Cir 1992); Kopp, 951
F2d at 529 (consulting an application note supplementing § 1B1.3 in determining
whether to depart from the offense level calculated under the fraud guideline), with
Downs, 123 F3d at 644; Studevent, 116 F3d at 1563; Roen, 279 F Supp 2d at 989-91
(examining departure principles under § 5K2.0 and the commentary to § 2B1.1).
113 USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n 19 (2009); USSG § 5K2.0 (2008).
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the calculation of intended loss does not mention the amount at
114
risk or the possible loss.
C.

Optimal Outcome: Determining the Amount at Risk

There are significant advantages to an objective approach,
measuring the amount put at risk by the defendant's scheme.
First, this approach is wise to hold it immaterial that a defendant claims to have intended that the loans be repaid, where it is
clear that the defendant intended to leave lenders with loans
115
that are riskier and less valuable than the lenders thought.
Second, the task of ascertaining reliable evidence that a defendant did or did not truly intend to inflict a particular loss is one
of the more troublesome aspects of the intended loss inquiry. By
the time he reaches trial, no defendant has an incentive to tell
the court about the magnitude of the loss he was hoping would
come about, a figure that should correspond to the defendant's
true motive of gain. 1 6 Although there is an argument to be made
that it is preferable to assess intended loss by examining what a
defendant subjectively intended, in order to sentence each
defendant in accordance with the notion that culpability, too, is
subjective, the adverse incentives produced by this standard
suggest a more objective approach.
These advantages of an objective approach complement one
another. It is fairly straightforward to determine that a defendant intended to leave a lender with unfavorable loans, based on
objective evidence of the defendant's actions from the outset
of the fraud, and upon finding that such was the situation, it
does not seem problematic to infer that an amount of loss was
intended; this approach relieves a sentencing court from an
investigation into a defendant's subjective intent.
Related to this is the matter of determining the point in time
from which to measure intended loss; the concept of intended
loss seems to take on the most accurate and sensible meaning
when the inquiry looks back to the outset of the fraud, before the
114 See Stockheimer, 157 F3d at 1090 ("The operative concept in determining the offense level is simply the 'intended loss.' The only hint of the relevance of economic reality
in the text of the guidelines and commentary is in the provision allowing a downward
departurefor transparently bogus schemes.") (emphasis in original).
115 See Carter,412 F3d at 869.
116 See United States v Moored, 38 F3d 1419, 1429 (6th Cir 1994) (assessing the presupposition that "all defendants charged with fraud ... indicate that they intended to
pay the money back," and holding that the use of intended loss is proper when there is
sufficient evidence that the defendant "did not intend to repay the loan" or "had no
realistic means to repay the loan").
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actual results have occurred. 117 Intended loss measures the defendant's culpability at the time of the criminal activity: "[The
amount of risk] measures the gravity of his crime; that he may
have hoped or even expected a miracle that would deliver his
intended victim from harm is both impossible to verify and pe1 18
ripheral to the danger that the crime poses to the community."
This approach makes it irrelevant that a defendant may not have
intended to cause a particular amount of loss.1 1 9 Even if a defendant hoped that his scheme would continue indefinitely and
would inflict only a small loss, the amount at risk in the scheme
120
is presumed to be the intended consequence of the fraud.
Here, it is important to address concerns about measuring
the amount at risk. Probability theory and risk modeling provide
a useful supplement to the methodology employed by the First,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in their measurement of risk, confirming that the amount at risk is a quantifiable value. In this
objective framework, the concepts of expected value-in this
case, expected loss-and risk are crucial. Probability theory provides for the computation of these values; the expected value, or
the mean, is calculated by the sum of each possible outcome multiplied by its respective probability, while risk may be contemplated as "a measure of uncertainty" or, more appropriately
in this context, "a measure to capture the potential of sustaining
a loss."121

Risk modeling addresses both expected and unexpected
losses. While expected losses are merely average, day-to-day
losses, unexpected losses are characterized by low frequency and
117 See United States v Nichols, 229 F3d 975, 979 (10th Cir 2000) ("The reason the
intended loss figure is used, even if it is significantly greater than actual loss, is to
measure the magnitude of the crime at the time it was committed."). But see United
States v Calkins, 2006 WL 2430999, *3-4 (6th Cir) (reducing the amount of loans by the
fair market value of collateral at the time of sentencing to compute intended loss).
118 United States v Brownell, 495 F3d 459, 463 (7th Cir 2007). See also Miller, 588 F3d
at 566 (explaining that an interpretation of intended loss as consisting of only intended
foreclosure loss is too narrow); Innarelli, 524 F3d at 290 ([The Guidelines anticipate
that the defendant will be punished commensurate with the degree of loss he reasonably
expected to occur as long as this amount is greater than the victims' actual lossincluding where the victims actually incurred no loss at all."), citing McCoy, 508 F3d
at 79.
119 Miller, 588 F3d at 566 ("[A] determination that there is intended loss attributable
to [the defendant] is not precluded even though ... he intended that all of the loans be
repaid."); Lane, 323 F3d at 590 (disregarding the defendant's argument that he did not
intend to cause a loss, since only a small amount of the loan was secured by property).
120 See Lauer, 148 F3d at 768.
121 Anna S. Chernobai, Svetlozar T. Rachev, and Frank J. Fabozzi, OperationalRisk:
A Guide to Basel II Capital Requirements, Models, and Analysis 15 (John Wiley &
Sons 2007).
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high severity, and loan application fraud falls into the latter
category. One mechanism utilized by banks to protect themselves
122
against fraud losses is to obtain insurance against this risk.
Risk models and insurance models set forth specific formulas for
assessing expected losses and unexpected losses for lenders in
the mortgage industry. 123 These models provide an effective
framework for assessing the potential consequences of loan
application fraud, demonstrating that it is feasible to measure
the amount at risk, as proposed.
CONCLUSION

In assessing intended loss under § 2B1.1, for purposes of
sentencing a defendant convicted of mortgage fraud, the
authority of the circuit courts is in disarray. When the courts
recognize the disagreement, they often characterize it as a dispute between a subjective and objective inquiry; however, it
seems more accurate to express the conflict using the distinction
between actual intent and constructive intent. This more
coherent explanation of the conflict also provides a basis for an
inquiry into the amount at risk. A measurement of the amount
at risk is not only a true representation of intended loss in
mortgage fraud cases, but it is also a workable inquiry that can
be conducted uniformly in sentencing defendants convicted of
mortgage fraud.

122 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document: Operational
Risk 15 (Bank for International Settlements 2001).
123 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, InternationalConvergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards 24-25, 55, 76-77, 325-26 (Bank for International
Settlements 2006).

